By Csaba Nikolenyi
This books examines the institutional foundations of coalition govt within the ten post-communist democracies of jap and imperative Europe for the 1990-2010 interval: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Its critical argument is that transformations within the association of political associations systematically clarify adaptations in styles of multi-party govt throughout those states. The booklet begins with the basis that electoral structures and constitutional provisions in regards to the powers, the constitution, and the connection among parliament and the presidency make certain the measure to which political energy is dispersed or centred within the political procedure. at the foundation of those institutional good points, 3 teams of states are unusual in regards to their measure of strength focus; the substantive chapters of the ebook show how those institutional combos and variations form 3 particular elements of get together govt which trap the most levels of the lifecycle of coalitions governments: the formation of electoral coalitions, executive formation and govt length. in particular, 3 comparative chapters verify the influence of institutional energy focus at the measurement of electoral coalitions; the chance that political events shape a minority govt; and the variety of days executive lasts in place of work. the most discovering of the e-book is that energy focus issues: political events in these democracies the place associations are designed to pay attention political strength are likely to shape huge electoral coalitions, they generally tend to shape majority instead of undersized governments, they usually construct tougher cupboards. additionally, the booklet incorporates a particular case examine of presidency formation in Hungary and a formerly unstudied comparability of oblique presidential elections in 4 states: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia.
Comparative Politics is a sequence for college kids, academics, and researchers of political technological know-how that bargains with modern executive and politics. international in scope, books within the sequence are characterized via a rigidity on comparative research and powerful methodological rigour. The sequence is released in organization with the eu Consortium for Political study. for additional information stopover at: www.ecprnet.eu.
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Extra resources for Institutional Design and Party Government in Post-Communist Europe
Sample text
E. the constitutional requirement that the legislature must designate the new prime minister simultaneously with the passage of the vote of no-confidence in the incumbent executive. Of the ten states only three have adopted this measure: Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Interestingly, the use of the constructive vote of no-confidence is just as rare in Western Europe: of the 15 West European EU member states only Germany and Spain have this rule in their constitutions. 1 summarizes the key institutional differences among the fifteen established and the ten new European democracies on three dimensions: the electoral system, the number of parliamentary chambers and the constitutional system of government.
This promise to the electorate raises the party’s audience costs because breaking it would lead to the party’s loss of credibility in the eyes of its voters which may well lead to electoral losses in the future (Kohno 1997). Constraint theory was developed largely in response to the failure of institution-free game theoretic models, stressing the size and ideological-policy preferences of political parties as independent variables, to explain the formation of minority governments. Budge and Laver (1986) claimed that the reason why game theoretic models may fail to predict the formation of minority governments is the assumption that they make about the cabinet formation game being constant-sum.
Presidencies differ not only in terms of the method of their election but also in terms of the actual powers of their office. The literatures on comparative and post-communist presidencies have no shortage of indices to measure presidential powers (Shugart and Carey 1992; Lucky 1994; McGregor1994; Siaroff 1995; Hellmann 1996; Fry 1997; Beliaev 2006). g. g. Czech Republic, Poland) and these differences often do not coincide with the method of presidential selection. In terms of these foundational institutional choices, the ECE democracies show both similarities to and differences from their West European counterparts.