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By Esther A. Solomon

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It may be said that in these particular cases their svanipa aJone is tattva, but this will not help. Tativa has many meanings —time-nature ( kala-svampa ) , space-nature ( desasvampa) and nature as connected with space and t\mQ{desakala~ sambaddha-svarapd) If any one of these is meant, the definition will be too narrow; if the aggregate is regarded as intended, the definition will not apply to each, and if each is intended, the definition will not comprehend the case of the aggregate. It may be urged that that is tattva which is found to be exactly as it is apprehended in cognition; that is to say, if a thing is found to possess such attributes as it was known to have in cognition ; then it is tattva, reality.

Are not possible with regard to it, that is to say, of which one could be positively certain. A dreamer perceives all visesas and yet his cognition is not valid. , is contradicted as it is not found to be so Much better than this is the assumption of the removal of contradiction (yyaghatG-parihara) by unknown causes. It may be urged that by 'visesasahitopalambha is not meant 'cognition along with visesa (distinguishing feature)', but 'cognition of an object along with its visesa. The visesa of silver is not present in nacre, so the definition will not apply to the erroneous cognition of siver in respect of nacre; whereas in the case of the true perception of silver, silver is found to possess the visesa revealed in the cognition.

One would thus not have faith in any cognition. g silverness) as invalid even in respect of the uncontradicted aspect ('before me'), then someone might very well argue that if knowledge of silver is contradicted in respect of nacre-silver, it should be regarded as contradicted (and so invalid) even in respect of the real silver, because they are both silver and you would have no answer to give except that the instance of valid cognition popularly accepted as such would have to be given up. It may be urged that if the qualifier of knowledge in the form of its object is also a qualifier of the thing, then on account of this similarity or correspondence with the object the knowledge should be regarded as valid; and this validity should be verified in respect of all specific objects or qualifiers; for instance, 'silverness' an object of knowledge is not present in nacre as its qualifier so the cognition, 'This is silver' is invalid in that aspect, even though it may be valid in respect of the 'this' aspect.

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